Energy Policy and the PIU Energy Review.. by Helm, Dieter
5 OXERA
2
Energy Policy and the PIU Energy Review
Dieter Helm, OXERA Director, and Fellow, New College, Oxford
Introduction
The PIU’s Energy Policy Review marked a turning point in energy policy.
For the previous 20 years, policy had been pursuing a path of gradual
government disengagement from the energy sector. Apart from some
elements of the nuclear sector, government ceased to own energy assets.
The promotion of competition in electricity generation and the supply of
electricity and gas opened up the prospect of the sector becoming much
like other commodity markets. Even the natural monopolies were peeled
back and exposed to market forces where possible.
At the end of the 1990s, many thought the process of disengagement was
an irreversible one. A series of events disabused government of this notion.
The unanticipated doubling of oil prices revived the sorts of energy policy
concerns last witnessed in the 1970s. Major failures in California pointed
to the fragility of the new market structures. North Sea gas was beginning
to run out just when electricity was becoming increasingly an annex of
the gas industry. Nuclear plant were beginning to close. And
overshadowing the whole sector were the challenges posed by
environmental pollution and climate change.
As these disparate developments arose, government lacked the expertise
to think through the consequences. The PIU exercise was designed with
this vacuum in mind, as the start of a process leading to a new energy
policy framework. The results have been disappointing, although not
surprising, given the way the review was conducted. To see why, we
begin by setting out the background to the PIU review, and then review
the process and outcome, and critique the analysis which supported its
conclusions. A number of recommendations are made as to the next steps
in designing an energy policy fit for the new context of the 2000s and
2010s, and its institutional framework.
The Background to the PIU Review
Energy policy has tended to ebb and flow with the balance of demand,
supply and price. In the immediate years after the Second World War, the
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priority was to keep up with the demand for energy created by the post-
war recovery and subsequent expansion. As the economy grew at around
3%, electricity demand grew at around 7% per annum, and the state-
owned energy utilities planned and invested accordingly.
With the OPEC oil shock in the early 1970s, the decades of cheap oil and
other fossil fuels came to an abrupt end. The threat of physical supply
interruptions for oil, combined with power cuts caused by striking miners,
altered the priorities of energy policy. The 1970s saw the Plan for Coal to
promote domestic sources of supply, renewed interest in nuclear power,
and the development of the North Sea. Oil prices above $10 per barrel
(bbl) made these offshore sources economic, and Britain’s energy policy
by the end of the decade focused on maximising production of oil, gas and
coal as a protection against OPEC and to bolster the balance of payments.
When the Iranian revolution led to the second oil shock in 1978/79, taking
the price to $30/bbl, this approach appeared vindicated. The fast breeder
reactor and the thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) were all part
of this response to oil prices, and it was to be carried over to the
Conservative government after the 1979 election. Indeed, in 1981 the then
Secretary of State, David Howell, announced a programme of ten
pressurised water reactors (PWRs), one per year for the next decade.
The turning point came in 1982, with Nigel Lawson’s speech on the ‘market
for energy’ (Lawson, 1982), which rejected planning by the Department of
Energy, and heralded a market-driven approach. From that point
onwards, the path for the next two decades was set. Once the miners’
strike of 1984/85 had been won, first gas, then electricity could be
privatised, with the promotion of competition being the main driver of
the regulatory regime.
The 1980s and 1990s were a period when the Lawsonian approach was
appropriate. Privatisation created an equity interest in the energy
businesses, and, when combined with RPI – X regulation, the management
turned their attention to sweating the assets. The electricity and gas
industries cut their labour forces substantially and were able to make
substantive profits as a result. Investment was not a priority: the peak
demand on the electricity system in 2000 was roughly what it had been
in 1980. Very few power stations came to the end of their physical lives in
this period, so that the ‘dash for gas’, when it came in the 1990s, displaced
coal. Both the gas and electricity networks were robust and required little
additional investment. Asset-sweating worked perhaps most spectacularly
in the nuclear industry, where the advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs)
were finally made to deliver a respectable load factor. Sizewell B was
eventually added to the system, but it was not strictly necessary, and the
case made for it at the Sizewell B inquiry in the mid-1980s (and for Hinkley
C) proved hopelessly overstated.
The dash for gas, encouraged by the electricity regulator as a way of
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pushing up the capacity margin and helping to contribute to the eventual
collapse of wholesale prices in the run-up to the introduction of the new
electricity trading arrangements (NETA). It also put pressure on the gas
transmission system as the electricity industry became increasingly
dependent on this fuel source.
A further contribution to the ease with which the market approach was
implemented came from fossil-fuel prices. The 1980s and 1990s were
decades of cheap oil, gas and, eventually, coal. The oil price collapsed in
the early 1980s, making a mockery of the assumption that had
underpinned policy in the late 1970s. Howell’s nuclear programme was
an obvious casualty, although successive governments pushed on with
THORP. The 1980s and 1990s ended up becoming more like the 1950s and
early 1960s, with the brief interlude of the Gulf War in 1990, when prices
touched $30/bbl.
This happy combination of excess supply, low prices and economic
prosperity was the background to the neglect of energy policy in the 1990s.
The Department of Energy was closed down in 1992, with the rump staff
transferred to the DTI, where the policy resources diminished further.
Although there were temporary ‘crises’ in 1992/93 and 1997/98 over coal
closures, what passed for energy policy was in reality what Offer, Ofgas
and then Ofgem did.
The focus on competition and asset-sweating, combined with the growth
in reliance on cheap fuels (notably oil and gas), carried with it the seeds of
a possible future crisis. As the 1990s’ boom continued, the combination of
higher demand, lower exploration and production activity, and the slow
erosion of the non-OPEC sources of oil supply gradually rebuilt OPEC’s
market power. The oil price shock at the end of the 1990s had some of these
features in common with that in the early 1970s. This time, however, the
tensions in the Middle East spilled over into military action after the price
shock, thereby prolonging its effects.
This shock then fed through to the price of gas, as the interconnector began
to exert its influence over the British market, and this, in turn, called into
question the economics of new combined-cycle, gas-turbine (CCGT) power
stations. Investment was further undermined by the collapse of wholesale
electricity prices. By the end of the 1990s, investment had effectively
stopped in electricity generation.
The North Sea had also been exploited to the full in the 1990s on the back
of the dash for gas. By the end of the decade, North Sea gas was beginning
to run out, bringing the British energy position more in keeping with that
in France and Germany, where the lack of indigenous fuel sources had
meant that energy policy to address imports, and import reliance played
a continuing role after the 1970s’ OPEC shock in a way it had not in Britain.
In the 2000s and 2010s, Britain will depend increasingly on Norway and
Russia for fuel supplies, and the former, as a small country, will probably
follow a pricing policy matching that of Gazprom in Russia.
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The shift to imports and the growth of demand will require a supporting
infrastructure to facilitate the larger gas flows from new directions. The
gas network will therefore move into an investment phase and require a
regulatory regime that focuses more on capital expenditure and the cost
of capital than on operating costs and asset-sweating. It will also require
an element of coordination and planning which has not been needed since
the National Transmission System (NTS) was first developed by the Gas
Council and then the British Gas Corporation.
Thus, the benign neglect of energy policy in the 1980s and 1990s, and the
focus on minimising costs rather than investment, while probably the
right approach then, is not particularly well suited to the challenges ahead.
This conclusion would probably hold, even if there were not the shadow
of the new environmental agenda hanging over the future of the energy
sector. With it, too, a much more radical change of direction may be
required.
The environmental agenda has gradually crept up on the energy sector
over the past two decades. Margaret Thatcher ‘discovered’ climate change
in the late 1980s, and Chris Patten’s White Paper in 1990, ‘This Common
Inheritance’ (DETR, 1990) marked the decisive shift from a largely scientific
matter to one incorporated into the political process. But the early impacts
on energy policy were minimal. The new privatised industries were in any
event displacing coal and, by the end of the 1990s, the coal industry was
a shadow of its former self. In consequence, both SO2 and CO2 emissions
fell without the need for active intervention, and the recession of 1990–93
added to the downward pressure on emissions.
This further happy coincidence of the effects of the market approach and
the fall in the level of emissions could not last, and several features of the
energy markets in the 1990s made a serious attempt to continue the
downward pressure on emissions much more difficult. The fall in prices
undermined attempts to encourage energy efficiency, and it built up a
powerful political interest in keeping prices down. Renewables became
relatively more expensive, and the economics of nuclear power similarly
worsened. Low prices kept demand up and non-carbon supply
uncompetitive: exactly the opposite of what the environmental concerns
dictated.
It gradually dawned on the then DETR and the DTI that the shift to a low-
carbon economy would require quite radical changes to the way in which
the energy industries are structured. Renewables are typically small-
scale embedded technologies, and the electricity transmission and
distribution systems are particularly unsuitable for a large renewables
market share—a fact that NETA would make painfully obvious. A
renewables programme would mean a major redesign of the electricity
network and therefore a significant investment programme. Achieving a
step change in energy efficiency would be a similarly massive task. The
costs would be huge, and serious consideration was beginning to be given9 OXERA
to what had been almost unthinkable in the 1990s—that nuclear might
have a future.
Policy interventions in the late 1990s did little to help. The Climate Change
Levy (CCL) was a tax on business not domestic users, and, because of the
desire to protect the coal industry, was an energy not a carbon tax. It soon
got bogged down in the politics of lobbying for specific technologies to be
exempt (‘picking winners’ in all but name) and in negotiated agreements
to buy off the industrial lobby. The emissions trading scheme was arguably
even worse: it ended up with government paying industry to make
emissions reductions which would probably have been made anyway,
and again it excluded coal by excluding the electricity generators.
This then was the energy agenda which confronted the government at the
end of the 1990s. There was no need to panic, since global warming was a
very long-term process, and the growth of gas imports would be gradual.
The networks would, it was believed, continue to deliver for some time to
come, and, in any event, Ofgem was supposed to ensure that they would
do so. But the fuel protests in September 2000 and then the Californian
crisis jolted this complacency. The fuel protests demonstrated how
vulnerable energy networks could be, given the ‘just-in-time’ delivery
which information technology had facilitated. Ministers and officials
warned that electricity and gas might be uncomfortably ‘just in time’ too
and an internal review took place of all the networks.
The Californian event exacerbated the sense of unease. Here was probably
the most advanced economy in the world brought to a standstill by power
cuts in the context of a deregulated electricity system which mirrored
some aspects of the arrangements in England and Wales (upon which it
drew heavily in the design stages). If it could happen in California, why
might it not happen here too? Vested interests tried to dismiss it all as the
fault of the regulators—and in particular a combination of planning
obstacles and limitations on long-term contracts. But this was too
simplistic, even for those who had little real understanding of the
complexities of the Californian system, the conduct and interests of the
companies, or the weaknesses of the network infrastructure. When
Railtrack’s network became paralysed after the Hatfield derailment, there
was a great unease that there might be something generally wrong with
the British infrastructures, and that the promotion of competition and
the type of regulation used in Britain might simply be reinforcing a
perceived long-term tendency for Britain to underinvest in infrastructure
while focusing too narrowly on operating efficiency.
France and Germany might have overmanned and inefficiently run
networks compared to Britain, but at least they were well developed and
worked well. The Labour government, with its rhetoric about
‘modernising Britain’, found itself sidetracked into concerns about asset-
sweating and regulation.
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This then was the background to the PIU review. It was not unique to
Britain. The EU had published its Green Paper on security of supply in
2000 (Commission of the European Communities, 2000), and the USA had
similarly drawn up an energy report (National Energy Policy Development
Group, 2001). These two were very similar, save that the European document
concentrated on gas imports, while the US focused on oil imports. Both
pointed to the CO2 problem.
The PIU Process
In the spring of 2001, these various concerns built up to a sufficient pitch
to trigger a substantive review of energy policy. The foot-and-mouth
epidemic postponed the election; however, once the election had been held,
a review was rapidly announced before the summer recess. It was a mark
of the decline of the standing of the DTI’s Energy Directorate with Downing
Street that the Cabinet Office’s PIU was charged with the task, not the DTI.
Initially, the DTI would not even have the ministerial chair, although this
changed as the Prime Minister warmed towards nuclear, and Brian Wilson
became Energy Minister.
Once the review was announced, the various lobbies and interest groups
began in earnest to campaign for their preferred options. The scale of this
activity should have conditioned the PIU team’s approach, but in fact the
way the team went about the review reinforced this pressure. The PIU set
up a web site, and published a list of questions at the outset in July 2001,
inviting all the stakeholders to contribute, which many duly did, with
over 400 submissions coming in by September 2001.
For the PIU team, there was clearly a choice of methodology at the outset.
The obvious approach would have been to treat the exercise as an
analytical and factual one, identifying the issues and assessing the
efficiency of alternative policy approaches. It could have tried to set out
alternative energy policy frameworks and spelt out the implications.
No doubt it tried to do some of this, but it was hampered in two ways.
First, its team inherited quite a lot of work from the study already under
way at the PIU on resource productivity, and carried over some of the
team from that earlier project. In the early days, there was an attempt to
take the renewables agenda as an assumption onto the PIU review, which—
rightly—the team resisted. Second, any coherent answer in the form of an
energy policy framework would have produced clear losers, and within a
quasi-political context this was somewhat constrained. For example, any
sensible environmental policy would inevitably have nasty consequences
for the coal lobby. Building nuclear power stations would offend the green
lobby. Too much by way of renewables would impose high costs, and a
realistic carbon tax would hurt industry and voters, who might prefer
low prices. A more interventionist policy would offend Ofgem, and the
DTI/DEFRA conflicts would have had to be managed.11 OXERA
It was therefore perhaps inevitable that the PIU would find it hard to
reconcile these conflicting interests and come to definite conclusions, and
would end up with a compromise, with something for everyone. The
various lobbies all had their shopping lists, and by and large the PIU
report kept most of them happy. While recognising concerns, it broadly
defended the status quo of NETA and Ofgem’s performance on networks. It
argued that climate change should only be addressed here if other
countries did so too, thus assuaging industry, who knew that others
probably would not. Whatever the environmental rhetoric, that probably
meant that low prices would continue. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s
Foreword to the PIU report actually stated that an objective was ‘cheap’
energy (PIU, 2002, p. 3).
The environmental lobby could, however, also take some comfort. A 20%
Renewables Obligation was recommended by 2020—inevitably, given
the very limited time the PIU had, without much serious cost analysis of
its implications. This was reinforced by an energy efficiency target. A
carbon tax was also mooted, but far enough into the future to avoid
offending shorter-term political interests. Nuclear was not given the go-
ahead, which some environmentalists had feared, but it was nevertheless
given some encouragement about ‘keeping the options open’ and the
importance of its contribution.
The PIU did wrestle with the issue of institutional reform, but what it
came up with was less radical than it appeared. It recommended that a
Sustainable Energy Policy Unit be set up, something which the DTI quickly
latched onto, as a way of increasing its resources without ceding its control
to a more independent Energy Agency or to DEFRA. Such a Unit did not
appear to pose much of a threat to Ofgem either.
Not surprisingly, the response by most of the lobby groups was
supportive. Only the serious press and academics criticised the review
publicly in the days after it was published. Ministers, too, could live with
the results, picking out the bits that favoured their own predispositions
and interests, and, although a White Paper and eventually legislation
was promised, in reality there was little immediately to introduce new
legislation for. The DTI could welcome the report, and eventually issue a
consultation paper asking almost all the main questions again, safe in the
knowledge that there was no political urgency.
In retrospect, then, whatever the intentions and however good the
analysis, the PIU process was one which lent itself more to a political
objective of keeping as many interests happy as possible. The PIU report
produced no significant casualties or disaffected parties. But at the end of
the process the government was no nearer resolving the issues outlined
above in ‘The Background to the Review’, nor to having anything which
might resemble a coherent energy policy as a result. In the end, there was
not enough of an imminent crisis to mandate action.
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Analytical Weaknesses
Even with a flawed process, the PIU report could still have provided an
analytical framework within which the government could begin to
construct an energy policy. Although the exercise quickly slipped from
the intention of producing a report of government to the more modest
one, of a report to government,
1 
the PIU could nevertheless have provided
the basis for decisions and implementation to follow quickly thereafter.
That it did not do so reflects the fact that a small team could not possibly
produce the level of necessary analysis in a few months.
There are three main components to designing an energy policy: a
specification of the objectives; an analysis of the nature of the problems;
and a coherent set of policy instruments. Not surprisingly, in all three
areas, the PIU report does not provide give clear guidance to government.
The report recommends that the objectives of energy policy meet the
objectives of sustainable development—environmental, economic and
social—and ‘consistent with this’ should be ‘the pursuit of secure and
competitively priced means of meeting the UK’s energy needs, subject to
the achievement of an environmentally sustainable energy system’
(PIU, 2002, p. 7). Elsewhere, the PIU states in respect of greenhouse gases
that ‘it would make no sense to incur abatement costs in the UK and
thereby harm our international competitiveness, if others were not
contributing.’ (PIU, 2002, p. 9). Sustainable development is an objective,
but only if others pursue it too.
The PIU report does not suggest how these overlapping objectives might
be traded off against each other. The central tension is between price,
security and the environment. As noted above, in the Prime Minister’s
Foreword to the report, more confusion is sown, with the objectives being
‘cheap, reliable and sustainable sources of energy supply’ [my italics].
The difference between a well-designed energy policy and a wish list is
that the objectives are clearly specified in such a way as to be able to
identify (and preferably measure) success or failure in meeting them. The
Conservatives had reduced the objectives towards economic efficiency, and
used competition as the policy instrument. Labour, after 1997, in the social
democratic tradition, added objectives to the policy framework, thereby
complicating policy design further. It is this step—and the trade-off
required—which was a central challenge for the PIU to address, and little
light is shed upon it.
The PIU rightly approaches the analysis of the emerging energy policy
problems in terms of the challenges of climate change and the security of
gas supplies. On the former, the starting point is the Royal Commission
1 A report ‘of’ the government is a statement of government policy; a report ‘to’ the
government is a contribution to the debate rather than a statement of policy.13 OXERA
on Environmental Pollution report (RCEP, 2000) and the reductions it
proposes. The science is taken as largely given, and a series of scenarios
are envisaged. For the PIU, the ‘solutions’ are in practice largely confined
to three: energy efficiency, renewables and nuclear. New technologies are
referred to, but most of the relevant policy analysis is in terms of these
three. The data (to the extent that the PIU had time to engage with the
empirical evidence) suggested to the PIU that, of these three options, there
are very considerable gains to be made at low cost from energy efficiency;
that renewables are (very) expensive but have ‘vast potential’; and that
nuclear is currently an available technology at costs which developed
economies might be able to live with. But such evidence as is presented
does not translate into the conclusions: because the main policy preferences
are more renewables and energy efficiency, the report plays up the scope
for scale economies and other cost savings in these areas. These the PIU
does not seriously question: there is no analysis of appraisal optimism,
which has been a feature of the lobbying for these options—and indeed
for nuclear too. Just how a 20% renewables target and a demanding energy
efficiency target meet the overarching objectives is never made clear. There
are no cost–benefit and risk assessments of a substantive empirical kind
in the report.
The second dimension of the analysis is the security of gas supplies. This
has a number of dimensions, some of which were discussed above (see
‘The Background to the PIU Review’). These are: availability of gas; the
networks capable of supplying gas; the interaction of the gas networks
with the need to balance the electricity system; and the ability of British
suppliers to sign long-term, take-or-pay contracts with Russia and
Norway, given the liberalisation of supplies and the ability of customers
to switch supplier.
The PIU places overwhelming emphasis on the first of these dimensions,
which is probably the least important. It rightly points out that there is
plenty of gas in Norwegian and Russian hands, but very little follows
from this. Indeed, if all these gas reserves were to be burned, the impact
on the climate would be serious. What matters is not whether there is
enough gas, but what it costs, whether the infrastructure exists to
transport it, and on what terms. The report contains virtually nothing
about the European gas infrastructure except to link this to the question
of liberalisation of European gas supplies. There are no maps, diagrams or
schemes to show what the pipeline options might be, either in Europe or
the North Sea. Whereas German, French and other European governments
would monitor these developments carefully, they largely escaped the
PIU’s attention.
Perhaps even more worrying is the failure of the PIU to evaluate the
problems of long-term, take-or-pay contracts within the context of the
British liberalised markets. The PIU wants the liberalisation of energy
and the promotion of competition of the 1980s and 1990s to be the
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‘cornerstone’ of future energy policy, but it fails to explain how this might
be compatible with long-term contracts, for gas, or indeed renewables
and nuclear. That the Renewables Obligation is a compulsory long-term
contract is not mentioned. Indeed, the words ‘long-term contract’ are
noticeably largely absent from the report. There is too little recognition of
how vertical integration has changed the way competitive markets work,
and the rapid concentration of the European energy market around three
dominant electricity companies (EDF, RWE and E.ON) and the large oil
and gas companies. And when it comes to security of supply, there is very
little analysis of Gazprom, despite its immense market power.
On the networks, while there are issues raised, there is no need for
immediate concern according to the PIU. All that needs to be done is to
‘monitor’ the position. The present situation is ‘healthy’ and intervention
would be ‘premature’. This is a bold and indeed heroic claim since there is
no evidence of substantial research by the PIU to support this. Presumably
it relied on the submissions made by the various parties. But even here it
was selective, appearing to disregard those that warned of a more urgent
set of problems. It might have reached the conclusion having set out some
of the options, listed out the areas of concern and then explained (preferably
with some risk analysis) why Ministers could be relaxed about the
networks. But it did not do this.
The final area of the analysis on which the PIU focused was the
institutional structure of energy policy. It rightly identified the weaknesses
in the current DTI resources, pointed out the need to address the interface
between environmental and economic policy, and indicated the need for
better scientific research and support. However, the role of Ofgem was
never seriously questioned, probably because the PIU had already
concluded that the policy of the 1980s and 1990s should be the cornerstone
of future policy. If competition and liberalisation are to dominate, if
networks are in good shape, and if we should not tackle CO
2 emissions if
others do not, then there is little need to change the main regulatory and
policy arrangements.
Institutional reform for the PIU is incremental, about tagging on a
Sustainable Energy Policy Unit to (probably) the DTI, which is likely to
absorb it within its Energy Directorate. No Energy Agency is required,
the remit of Ofgem need not change significantly, and institutional reform
boils down to a tidying up of the myriad environmental bodies that have
proliferated in the last few years. A ‘radical’ change in policy, which the
PIU claims it is recommending, needs only a small amount of institutional
change. Whether such a conclusion is warranted is a moot point, but it
should at least be based upon an analysis of the alternatives. Although
the PIU claims to have considered the options, if is far from clear how it
actually did so. Some principles are listed for good institutional design,
but how they lead to a Sustainable Energy Policy Unit and not an Energy
Agency is far from obvious. The result is likely to be a tinkering at the15 OXERA
edges of Whitehall, and indeed the state of permanent tension between
the DTI and the environmental department, now DEFRA, shows no sign of
abating. The DTI’s Public Service Agreement focuses on low prices as the
priority, which hardly helps to reconcile the various objectives.
Taking the analysis of environmental issues, gas dependency and
institutions, the PIU report does not make impressive reading. It is unlikely
to stand the test of time, and will not form a key reference for those who
want to see how analysis bears on policy. It compares poorly with the
European Commission’s Green Paper and the US report.
As a summary of the commonality that might emerge from the various
lobby groups, it makes interesting political reading. If energy policy is
conceived of as an attempt to reconcile a series of interests, the PIU provides
a solution. But as a serious attempt at analysis, the tools of the trade—
cost–benefit analysis, risk analysis, cost and demand analysis, contractual
design and risk assignment—are largely (and inevitably, given the time
and resources at the PIU’s disposal) absent.
Conclusions: A Better Way Forward
Energy policy is necessarily long-term. The assets are typically long-lived
and many are sunk costs. Investments require commitments, and these
almost always have a regulatory and political context. The ‘new’ energy
agenda of import dependence and the environment reinforces these
features. Importing from Russia is inevitably political. German officials
monitor Gazprom daily, and German and French companies try to manage
the political contexts. Ruhrgas has a stake in Gazprom, and a seat on its
Board. Climate change is global, long-term and any solution must be first
and foremost a political agreement.
A feature of British energy policy has been its ability to solve yesterday’s
problems. The OPEC shocks of the 1970s saw the civil service ill prepared
to address the new challenges. An Energy Department had to be quickly
cobbled together. In the 1980s, Ministers and officials carried on with the
1970s’ assumptions of energy security and rising oil prices, with the plan
for ten PWRs and THORP notable (and expensive) examples. Facing the
new challenges of the 2000s and 2010s, the PIU follows a broadly similar
pattern, recommending a continuation of the old policies with some new
targets and objectives tacked on. The result—continuity—fits the historical
pattern well. Despite the rhetoric, the PIU report is not radical: radical
changes in energy policy in Britain tend to happen as a result of crises, not
in anticipation of them.
There is, however, nothing inevitable about this. The PIU could have made
a major contribution to the future. That it did not is a pity, but it is not
irreversible. Its final recommendation that ‘the DTI should start a process
of full public consultation and engagement in energy policy’
(PIU, 2002, p. 161) is the logical extension of its attempt to reconcile interest
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groups, but it also provides an opportunity. The DTI has taken this to
mean that it should go back to basics and ask (roughly) the same questions
as the PIU all over again. For the reasons set out in this chapter, this is
probably the correct approach, since the PIU has added very little of
substance. However, there is a great difference between consultation to
ask interested parties what they want and sound analysis of the evidence.
It is the latter that the PIU could not provide, and which the current
meagre resources of the DTI will find very hard to deliver.
The implication of this last observation is that energy policy will only
start to reorient itself—to look out of the front window, rather than the
back—if government has the ability to do the analysis. Therefore, the
institutions may need to come first. A properly resourced centre for such
analysis in government is needed. The DTI has so far failed to deliver this,
and there are general reasons—not least its wider priorities—which
suggest it is unlikely to do so. The Sustainable Energy Policy Unit promises
little, and may well turn out to be partially a stakeholder exercise.
An Agency between DEFRA and the DTI, of government but not within a
department, may help to achieve this. It would enable a longer-term
perspective to be taken, attract bright people with energy expertise, and
provide a more transparent and informed basis for energy policy design.
The responsibility for energy policy will always ultimately rest with
Ministers, and Ministers will have to face the consequences of failure in
networks and supply, and in achieving climate change objectives, should
these occur. But Ministers would be better served by the provision of
expert advice and analysis at arm’s length than the more short-term (and
perhaps reassuring) advice of a small group of officials.
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